We present new empirical evidence for the way inflation reduces the inequality of the income distribution in the U.S. economy. The main mechanism emphasized in this paper is the "bracket creep" effect according to which inflation pushes income into higher tax brackets. Governments adjust the nominal income tax brackets slowly due to the rise in prices, typically less often than once every other year in the U.S. postwar history. We also develop a theoretical general equilibrium monetary model with income heterogeneity. In line with our time series evidence, it is rather the frequency of income tax schedule adjustments than the overall level of inflation that has a perceptible impact on the distribution of income. We find that a longer duration between two successive adjustments of the schedule reduces employment, savings, and output significantly.
Introduction
The "bracket creep" describes a shift of personal income into a higher tax bracket when taxable nominal income increases over time. This effect is considered to be particularly severe ("the cruelest tax") in times of high inflation as was seen during the last half of the 1970s when inflation rates averaged 8.9 percent annually (Blinder and Esaki, 1978) . To combat this "bracket creep" effect, the Reagan Administration implemented an indexation of the personal exemptions and the tax brackets based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
These provisions were actually enacted in 1981 as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA), but delayed in their implementation and did not become effective until 1985; see Auerbach and Feenberg (2000, p. 41) . The annual adjustment of the marginal tax rates with regard to inflation is also very likely to have an important effect on the distribution of income. First, the net income of the income-poor households increases ceteris paribus.
And second, the incentives to supply labor increases for the low-productivity households as the net wage rate increases.
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The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the "bracket creep," or rather its attenuation, on the distribution of income both empirically and in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the U.S. economy.
There is a well-known early strand of literature representing a broad empirical research effort aimed to contribute information on the (re-)distributional effects of inflation on the U.S. income and/or wealth distribution. It includes the works of Bach and Ando (1957) , Budd and Seiders (1971) , Bach and Stephenson (1974) , and Wolff (1979) . With some exceptions 2 this literature either (i) underlies a detailed disaggregate definition of wealth and discriminates a set of different income types (notably before taxes) and portfolios of different demographic groups of households, business and governmental sectors, etc. or (ii) investigates the effects of inflation determined by market forces and by public and private 1 With the help of U.S. panel data on individual tax returns, Saez (2003) uses the "bracket creep" as source of tax variation in order to construct instrumental variable estimates of the sensitivity of income to changes in tax rates. He estimates a labor supply elasticity of taxable income of around 0.4.
2 Bach and Ando (1957) and Bach and Stephenson (1974) see taxpayers as the main beneficiaries of inflation if it is assumed that debt will be paid off by collections from taxpayers and therefore the latter can be seen as "indirect debtors." They argue that if debt in form of governmental interest charges is repaid by taxation, inflation redistributes real purchasing power in favor of the higher income groups since these were slightly heavier taxpayers than federal bondholders in the early and mid 1950s and early 1970s.
transfer policies, before any subsequent distribution through personal income tax. The traditional empirical model, investigating the relationship between the Gini coefficient and the inflation rate, is the one by Schultz (1969) . Blinder and Esaki (1978) were the first to empirically analyze the effects of unemployment and inflation on quintile shares of income in the U.S. relying on linear regressions. Their specification has been advanced by Blank and Blinder (1985) by including autoregressive terms and more recently by Jäntti (1994) applying generalized least squares (GLS) estimation. Two recent studies examining the effects of "bracket creep" on income are Saez (2003) and Immervoll (2005) for the U.S. and Germany, the Netherlands, and the U.K., respectively. More general recent contributions on distributional effects of inflation are Romer and Romer (1998) and Galli and van der Hoeven (2001) . This paper contributes to the literature in quantitatively assessing "bracket creep" effects of inflation on the base of U.S. data and providing novel insights. In particular, we address the following three questions:
(1) Does the current level of (moderate) inflation matter?
(2) Does the frequency of tax schedule adjustment matter?
(3) Which of these channels of "bracket creep" is the crucial one in affecting the private sector and the distribution of income?
Our first method of choice to answer these questions is time series analysis techniques, in particular, bivariate measures in the frequency domain. We apply the latter to the most recently available time series on income inequality (Kopczuk, Saez, and Song, 2007) and inflation in the U.S. for a longer sample period than has previously been available. The strategy of the exercise is to take a stand on how the effective U.S. tax system was affected during the total postwar period and then to investigate the consequences of infrequent indexation relative to the sort of system that has been in place since the mid 1980s.
3 These techniques are rather descriptive and as such imposing less assumptions than the more structural specifications used in the existing literature. As they are computed for a continuous range of ordinary frequency, bivariate spectral density estimates are more informative with regard to the lead-lag relationship of income inequality and inflation. It is this kind of information that is crucially important in addressing the questions raised above.
To address these questions also in a DSGE framework, we develop a monetary general equilibrium model of progressive income taxation in order to study the effects of the "bracket creep." While the individual agents face idiosyncratic risk with regard to their productivity, there is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy as the government adjusts its tax schedule in a deterministic way and money grows at an exogenous and constant rate. In response to a higher inflation or a longer duration of the "bracket creep,"individuals face higher income taxes, both on average and marginally as the U.S. income tax is progressive.
As a consequence, agents adjust their labor supply and savings decisions. Surprisingly, agents do not change their behavior significantly between periods. However, if we consider a tax policy regime that adjusts the tax schedule for inflation more frequently, we find that agents increase both their labor supply and savings markedly compared to a system with less frequent adjustments. In line with our time series evidence, we, therefore, conclude that the inflation rate is a less important phenomenon for the effects of the "bracket creep" compared to its duration, i.e. the length of the time period between two successive income tax schedule adjustments for inflation. In summary, we carefully interpret our results to support the economic benefits of the ERTA.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents empirical evidence for U.S. time series. Section 3 introduces the overlapping-generations model with two assets, money and equity. The model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the U.S. economy in section 4. Our numerical results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Empirical analysis 2.1 Data
Our data on aggregate income inequality is drawn from Gini coefficient series that were most recently made available by Kopczuk et al. (2007) . The series date back to the late 1930s. The period of observation we cover, therefore, is considerably longer than the one of studies using annual data from the Current Population Surveys that became available in the 1960s. The Gini coefficient series provided by Kopczuk et al. (2007) is based on the large Social Security Administration (SSA) micro dataset. Besides the very long time period covered, the authors emphasize the following key advantages relative to the data that have been used in previous studies on inequality in the U.S.: The underlying SSA data mostly represent a one percent sample of the total U.S. population. Additionally, they are longitudinal as samples are selected based on the same Social Security Numbers every year. Finally, they have only very little measurement error. A further fact that makes the resultant Gini coefficient series particularly suited for our purposes is that it is based on individual rather than family-level data, which is more adequate in the context of income taxation. The series is available up to the year 2004. 
Time series analysis
The study of our time series in the time and frequency domain requires stationary processes. For the U.S. inflation series it has not yet been conclusively resolved whether it is best treated as stationary or non-stationary. To survey the voluminous literature on this subject is beyond the scope of this paper. Note, however, in a recent and comprehensive application of unit root testing Ng and Perron (2001) show their results to crucially depend on the choice of test. Therefore, unreflective reliance on unit root tests seems hazardous in the present context. Consequently, we adopt another approach in the spirit of Canova (1998) . We compare results with the known potential distortions induced by the detrending filter used (A'Hearn and Woitek, 2001, p. 327-328) , and compare across filters to judge robustness. For the inflation rate series, we also compare it to findings treating the raw series as stationary. The filters we consider are the widely used highpass Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing weight λ for annual series equal to 100 (HP), the log-difference filter (logD) that would be ideal for a difference stationary process, and the recently proposed bandpass Baxter-King filter (BK) and Christiano-Fitzgerald filter (CF) both with a cut-off frequency of 15 years; see Hodrick and Prescott (1997) , Baxter and King (1999) , and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) . Additionally, we use two recent modifications of the HP and BK filter suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) and A'Hearn and Woitek (2001), respectively. The modified HP filter (MHP) sets the smoothing parameter λ = 6.25 for annual series. The modified BK filter (MBK) takes care of the undesirable sidelobes in the gain function by so-called Lanczos's r-factors. Overall we rely on six different filter devices, one more than in a similar recent exercise by Wälde and Woitek (2004) . variance-covariance matrices with declining weights of autocovariances (Newey-West estimators) . Lag length q has been set to q = floor 4 (T /100) 2/9 following the suggestion in Newey and West (1987) . Figure 1 gives a visual summary of results by plotting a dot corresponding to the estimated correlation coefficient for inflation rate leads (Gini coefficient lags) of two years and one year (starting from the left), for contemporaneous correlations, and for inflation rate lags (Gini coefficient leads) for one and two years. Only coefficients significant at the 10% level or higher are displayed. They are shown as distributions for combinations of series filtered by different filtering techniques. As we take six different Gini and inflation (1948 Gini and inflation ( -1984 Gini and inflation ( and 1985 Gini and inflation ( -2004 filters into account − and in the case of the inflation rate series also the raw series −, there is a maximum of 7 × 6 = 42 significant correlation coefficients at each considered lag.
We find the most significant correlations at the two years lags and leads, respectively.
For 30 combinations of differently filtered series, all correlation coefficients at the two years inflation rate lead (lag) are negative (positive). This suggests a countercyclical relationship between inflation and income inequality at the corresponding frequency. Therefore, the effect that there are four positive contemporaneous estimates is a result one should expect:
when two time series of the same length are countercyclical at a lag of two years, they need to be procyclical if one series is lagged by half the length of a cycle. Note that the finding of five negative correlations at a lead of one year can be interpreted as an indication for a more complex cyclical structure shared by the two underlying series. It is also noteworthy that the mean frequency of tax bracket adjustment in the postwar U.S. is 2.11 years (see Table 7 in the Appendix). Overall, we estimate in about one fifth of considered possible correlations a significant coefficient.
For the pre-1985 period, there is evidence for a significant correlation between inflation and income inequality in less than five percent of analyzed cases (left schedule of Figure 2 ).
Both findings for the total and pre-1985 period somehow contrast with the ones of studies from the 1990s that find current inflation to be of progressive nature in the postwar U.S. (Bulir and Gulde, 1995 and Jäntti, 1994) .
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For the post-1984 period, clearly significant results are found in nearly half of the considered correlations both for one year and two years lags (right schedule of Figure 2 ). They are the ones that are most in favor of an adjustment effect: Although, the U.S. income tax system has been effectively indexed for inflation as of 1985, a perfect indexation is extremely hard to realize in practice. The fact that it takes time to assess the exact inflation rate and to adjust tax-band limits and other nominally defined parameters of the tax code accordingly can be interpreted as responsible for the significant correlations between inflation and income inequality at first and second annual lag. Positive as well as negative correlations at a zero lag can be seen as suggesting a partial offsetting of a progressive tax effect of inflation induced by schedule adjustment measures.
We carefully interpret these findings from time domain techniques as lending support to a transitorily inequality reducing impact of inflation that leads aggregate measures of inequality by at least one to two periods, and particularly depends on the effectiveness and duration of tax bracket adjustments.
An alternative approach that characterizes the dynamics of multiple time series in an intuitive summary way, and is suited to describing and analyzing them at different frequencies is spectral analysis. Any n-dimensional stationary process X t has a spectral representation at frequencies ω ∈ [−π, π] in the form of a spectral density matrix F (ω) . It is given by the Fourier transform of the covariance function γ jk (τ ), τ = 0, ±1, ±2, ..., for all j = 1, ..., n; k = 1, ..., n of the process
with
4 Jäntti (1994, p. 373) notes that the ERTA of 1981 is among the tax policies that most likely have affected the U.S. income distribution. To control for these changes in policy his estimates include a dummy taking on a value of one from 1981 onward. However, given that the tax bracket indexation for inflation represents the crucial change introduced by the ERTA, a later dated structural break should have been used as indexing was delayed until 1985.
Because F (ω) is an even function, it is sufficient to examine it in the interval [0, π] . The diagonal elements f 11 (ω) , ..., f nn (ω) are the real-valued autospectra or power spectra. The off-diagonal elements represent cross spectra f jk (ω) = c jk (ω)−iq jk (ω), consisting of c jk (ω) cospectra and q jk (ω) quadrature spectra.
Implementing (1) This allows estimation of the bivariate spectrum as follows.
denotes the error variance-covariance matrix. A (ω) is the Fourier transform of the
where L is the backshift operator.
The superscript "*" denotes complex conjugate transpose. As noted above, the crossspectra are complex valued functions in ω, but simple manipulations yield the more readily interpretable, real measures: phase shift ps (ω) and squared coherency sc (ω).
The phase shift (ps) measures the phase lead (ps > 0) or lag (ps < 0) of a series j over the series k at a certain frequency ω. The respective ps measure is computed at the maximum of squared coherency sc, i.e. at that frequency ω, where the cyclic components contained in the two series at stake show the highest degree of linear relationship. The sc measure takes on values between 0 and 1. Precisely, it indicates the proportion of the variance of the component of frequency ω of either series that can be explained by its linear regression on the other series; see Koopmans (1995, p. 142) . Both spectral parameters ps and sc can be calculated and displayed for a range of different frequencies. This gives us the phase and coherence spectral densities. Figure 3 illustrates plots of the key bivariate measures coherence and phase over the total period for a sample case. It displays the results for the sample case, where the inflation rate has been filtered using a standard HP filter, the Gini coefficient using the CF filter, respectively. Instead of plotting the phase in the interval [−π, π], we follow the suggestion in Priestly (1981, p. 709) and plot it in the intervals [−3π, π] , [−π, π] , and [π, 3π] , in order to avoid discontinuities due to the fact that the phase is only defined mod 2π. Figure 4 is the corresponding one for the two considered subperiods.
Figure 3: Sample spectra: Gini coefficient and inflation rate As can be seen from Table 1 and the sample case illustrated in Figure 3 and 4, the coherence spectrum is characterized by two peaks, corresponding to periodicities contained in the Gini coefficient series. One of these cyclic components lags the corresponding cycle contained in the inflation rate series (π), the other one shows a contemporaneous coherency (implied |ps| ≤ 1 year) with the period in the inflation series. For frequencies in-between these two phase constellations the corresponding sc estimates still take on considerable values. In our sample case illustration it equals about 10-28 percent (total period) and about 40-70 percent (pre-1985 period), respectively. Overall, the corresponding sc values range from about ten to more than 90 percent, depending on observation period and filter. In less than four percent of all considered cases a positive ps ≥ 1 is found (Table 1) . We abstract from these estimates in the following interpretation.
If we compare the different observation periods, we find that the average ps ≤ −1 at the Figure 4: Sample spectra: Gini coefficient and inflation rate (1948-1984 and 1985-2004) frequency corresponding to (a local) maximum of sc is −2.60 years ( effects of inflation continued for more than two and a half to about three years before being offset. In this case sc takes on sizable values over this span that persist to the zero lag. : 1951 : , CF: 1950 : -2002 : , logD: 1951 : -2004 c BK: 1951 -1984 , CF: 1950 -1984 , logD: 1951 -1984 d BK: 1985 , CF: 1985 -2002 , logD: 1985 -2004 In combination with our findings from time domain techniques, we interpret the results from frequency domain techniques as lending support to an inequality reducing impact of inflation that last longer and represented a continuing effect over several years in the 
Traditional OLS model specifications
Among the first to empirically analyze the effects of macroeconomic activity on income distribution in the postwar U.S. is the study by Schultz (1969) . It characterizes the relationship between inequality and inflation as a linear function. The dependent variable is the current Gini coefficient. The independents are current inflation rates, unemployment rates, and a linear trend function. Blinder and Esaki (1978) extended this baseline model by replacing the dependent with income shares of different segments of the population. Blank and Blinder (1986) and Jäntti (1994) elaborated this specification further by including first lags of the dependent variable in each equation and by introducing GLS based joint cross-equation tests, respectively. As the latter innovation applies to income shares, which, by definition, are jointly determined, and due to the fact that our focus is on overall inequality, we will rely on standard LS tests only. Additionally, we allow for a nonmonotone relationship both between inequality and inflation and between inequality and unemployment (Galli and van der Hoeven, 2001 and Jäntti, 1994) . Given the importance of time-lags documented in the preceding section, it also seems essential to us to address them structurally in the model. As our baseline model we estimate equations of the form
where L denotes the standard lag operator, u unemployment rates, and variables with tilde denote filtered series, using the six detrending filters described above. Because we are interested in the interplay between inflation and income distribution at business cycle frequencies, we choose to filter dependent and independent variables: Any possible distortion induced by the respective filter concerns both sides of the equation.
Significant estimates (at least, at a 10% level) for the considered total period and two subperiods are reported in Table 2 . Accordingly, the inflation rate lagged by two years has a significant progressive effect on income in half of the cases. The median p-value is reasonably high. However, the corresponding models explain only about five percent of the Gini coefficient's variance (median value) for the total period. In the pre-1985 period, current inflation and the inflation rate at first and second lag impact negatively on the Gini coefficient with the current effect being the most pronounced according to the median figures. This can be interpreted as reflecting the fact that in the absence of inflation indexed tax-limits, taxpayers are subject to higher (progressive) tax burdens in the meantime. The medians of the corresponding adjusted R-squareds range between 30 and 57%. Finally, for the post-1984 period we find no significant impact from the inflation series at any lag, suggesting that the indexation mechanism installed in 1985 countered the "bracket creep"
effect.
In order to get a more detailed picture of the impact of the delay in the adjustment of nominally defined parameters in the U.S. income tax code on inequality, we also estimated the following specifications where D t denotes dummy variables that take on values of 1 if tax-band limits were adjusted for inflation in t − a value of 0 else.
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The Appendix gives an overview and brief description of the nature of the historical adjustments. Respective sources are also given there. If these changes were effective in countering the "bracket creep," we would expect negative signs for the coefficients β 2 , β 8 , and β 11 and positive signs for all other coefficients of the π-series (multiplied by D) or, at least, of subsets of combinations of these coefficients. However, we find but two cases for the total period sample (allowing for sufficient degrees of freedom) that point into this direction: First, the case when series are filtered using the CF bandpass filter and D in its narrow definition is used. In this case, an offsetting effect through the tax code adjustment at the first lag of the inflation rate is estimated. Similarly, we find such an effect for current inflation if the series are detrended by the MHP filter and if D in its broader definition is included.
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This leads us to the conclusion that assessing the effects of changes of tax-band limits and other nominally defined parameters of the tax code in detail is a complex task, for it requires to consider adjustment induced changes in the behavior of the private sector.
These changes can be hardly controlled for in econometric models. A candidate model that is able to account for these changes is an adequate DSGE model that is set up and simulated in the following. 6 We also consider a broader definition of D that captures any adjustment of nominally defined parameters of the U.S. income tax code. See the Appendix for detail.
7 All detailed estimates are available on request from the authors. 
Households
Every year, a generation of equal measure is born. A subscript j of a variable denotes the age of the generation. The total measure of all households is normalized to one.
Households live a maximum of T + T R years. Lifetime is stochastic and agents face a probability s j of surviving up to age j conditional on surviving up to age j − 1. During their first T years, agents supply labor l elastically. After T years, retirement is mandatory.
Agent i maximizes her life-time utility:
where β, c i j , and m i j denote the discount factor, consumption and real money balances of agent i at age j, respectively. Instantaneous utility u(c, m, 1 − l) is given by:
Workers are heterogeneous with regard to their labor earnings per working hour. The worker's labor productivity e(z, j) is stochastic and depends on his age j and an idiosyncratic labor productivity shock z. We assume that the idiosyncratic part of productivity follows a first order finite state Markov chain with conditional transition probabilities given by:
where z, z ∈ E. Although the dynamics of productivity may be modeled slightly better by a second order Markov chain (Shorrocks, 1976 ) the improvement in accuracy is rather small and does not justify the considerable increase in the model's complexity.
Furthermore, agents are born without wealth, a 1 = 0, and cannot borrow, a j ≥ 0 for all j.
Wealth a is composed of real money m and capital k. Capital or, equally, equity k earns a real interest rate r. We further assume a short-sale constraint k ≥ 0. Parents do not leave altruistic bequests to their children. All accidental bequests are confiscated by the state. 
where u x (.) denotes the first partial derivative of the utility function with regard to the argument x = c, 1 − l, m. The first-order conditions of the retired household are given by (12)- (14) with l i jt ≡ 0.
Production
Firms are of measure one and produce output with effective labor N and capital K. Effective labor N t is the product of working hours and individual productivity and is defined in more detail below.
Effective labor N t is paid the wage w t . Capital K t is hired at rate r t and depreciates at rate δ. Production Y t is characterized by constant returns to scale and assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
In a factor market equilibrium, factors are rewarded with their marginal product:
Government
Government expenditures consists of government consumption G t , government lump-sum transfers T r t to households, and social securities expenditures P en t . Government expenditures are financed by an income tax T ax t , seignorage S t , and confiscated accidental bequests Beq t :
We follow Castanñeda et al. (2003) and characterize the U.S. income tax structure by a progressive tax function. In particular, we also adapt the following functional form for the income tax function that is based upon the estimates of Gouveira and Strauss (1994):
We further assume that the government adjusts the nominal income tax brackets every T B year. Without the loss of generality, we assume that the income tax rate schedule is adjusted in periods (=years) t ∈ {0, T B, 2T B, 3T B, . . .}. With regard to our tax function (20), this is equivalent to assume that the tax parameters {b 0,t , b 1,t , b 2,t } are adjusted every T B years so that the real tax burden is the same as in the benchmark year t = 0. As a consequence, agents average and marginal income tax rates increase in the years between two successive tax rate adjustments as inflation increases the nominal income P t y i jt ceteris paribus.
Monetary authority
Nominal money grows at the exogenous rate θ:
The seignorage is transferred lump-sum to the government:
Stationary equilibrium
The concept of equilibrium applied in this paper uses a recursive representation of the consumer's problem following Stokey et al. (1989) . Let V 
subject to (9), (10) or (11) We will consider a stationary equilibrium where the inflation rate is constant in every period t. Furthermore, government consumption is assumed to be constant, G t = G, and pensions pen t are assumed to be of equal magnitude every T B periods, respectively. As a consequence, the factor prices, aggregate capital and labor, and the distribution µ t are also the same every T B periods, respectively.
Definition
A stationary equilibrium for a given government policy {b 0,t , b 1,t , b 2,t , G t , pen t } and central bank policy θ t = θ is a collection of value functions V i jt (k, m, z, µ) , individual policy rules m, z, j, µ) , relative prices of labor and capital {w t , r t }, and a law of motion for the distribution µ t+1 = g(µ t ) such that:
1. Money grows at the exogenous rate θ and the seignorage (22) is transferred lump-sum to the government.
2. The inflation rate π t is constant and equal to the money growth rate θ. 5. Individual and aggregate behavior are consistent:
where a t (.) ≡ k t (.)+m t (.) are the optimal next-period assets and y t (k, m, z, j) denotes the real income of a j-year old agent with productivity z, capital k, and money m in period t. Furthermore, tr t = T r t .
6. Relative prices {w t , r t } solve the firm's optimization problem by satisfying (17) and (18).
7. Given the government policy {b 0,t , b 1,t , b 2,t , G t , pen t } and the distribution µ t , the individual policy rules c t (.), k t+1 (.), m t+1 (.), and l t (.) solve the consumer's dynamic program (23).
8. The goods market clears in every period t:
9. The dynamics of the distribution µ t+1 = g(µ t ) are consistent with individual behavior:
where 1 k =k t (.) is an indicator function that takes the value one if k = k t (.) and zero otherwise. 1 m =m t (.) is defined in an analogous way. Furthermore, the new-born generation has zero wealth, k = 0 and m = 0.
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Notice further that, in particular,
In the Appendix, we describe the computational algorithm that we use in order to compute an approximation to this equilibrium.
Calibration
Periods correspond to years. We assume that agents are born at real lifetime age 20 which corresponds to j = 1. Agents work T = 40 years corresponding to a real lifetime age of 60. They live a maximum life of 60 years (T R = 20) so that agents do not become older than real lifetime age 80. The sequence of conditional survival probabilities {s j } 59 j=1 is set equal to the Social Security Administration's survival probabilities for men aged 20-78 for the year 1994.
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The survival probabilities decrease with age, and s 60 is set equal to zero.
The calibration of the parameters α, δ, pen, and θ and the Markov process e(z, j) is chosen in accordance with existing general equilibrium studies. Following Prescott (1986) , the capital income share α is set equal to 0.36. The annual rate of depreciation is set equal to 
σ y1 = 0.38 δ = 0.08. Pensions are distributed lump-sum to the retired agents. The replacement ratio of pensions to net average earnings amounts to 50% in every period t. Hence, pensions are a function of the distribution µ t and, hence, K t and N t , and are the same every T B periods. The income tax rate is adjusted every T B = 3 years in accordance with the findings presented in section 2.
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The model parameters are presented in Table 3 .
The tax function (20) is calibrated with the help of the estimates from Gouveira and Strauss (1994).
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In particular, we set the income tax parameters in period t = 0 (where we normalized the price level to one, P 0 = 1) equal to b 0 = 0.258, b 1 = 0.768, b 2 = 0.031.
The income tax parameters b 0 and b 1 are taken from Gouveira and Strauss for the tax year are also presented in section 5. 12 These parameter values have also been applied by Castañeda et al (2003) .
1989, while b 2 has been adjusted so that the tax rate of the average income in our model is equal to the tax rate of the average U.S. income. Every T B years, these parameters are adjusted so that the average and marginal tax rates of the real income are unchanged between period T B and p · T B, p = 1, 2, . . ..
The labor endowment process is given by e(z, j) = e z j +ȳ j , whereȳ j is the mean lognormal income of the j-year old. The mean efficiency indexȳ j of the j-year-old worker is taken from Hansen (1993) , and interpolated to in-between years. As a consequence, the model is able to replicate the cross-section age distribution of earnings of the U.S. economy.
Followingİmrohoroglu et al. (1998), we normalize the average efficiency index to one. The age-productivity profile is hump-shaped and earnings peak at age 50.
The idiosyncratic productivity shock z j follows a Markov process. The Markov process is given by:
where j ∼ N (0, σ ). Huggett (1996) uses ρ = 0.96 and σ = 0.045. Furthermore, we follow Huggett and choose a lognormal distribution of earnings for the 20-year old with σ y 1 = 0.38 and mean y 1 . As the log endowment of the initial generation of agents is normally distributed, the log efficiency of subsequent agents will continue to be normally distributed. This is a useful property of the earnings process, which has often be described as log normally in the literature.
The remaining three parameters β, B, and γ from the utility function are chosen to match the following characteristics of the U.S. economy as closely as possible: i) the capital-output ratio K/Y amounts to 3.0 as found by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1995) , ii) the average labor 
Results
In this section, we study the effects of a change of the money growth rate θ or, equally, the inflation rate π on the stationary distribution of income. Remember that, in our benchmark case, the inflation rate is equal to 5% and the tax schedule is adjusted every 3 years. The effect of the "bracket creep" on the marginal and average tax rates is illustrated in Figures   5 and 6 (where the average real income of the economy is normalized to one). Obviously, the average income tax and the marginal tax rate hardly change after one or two years of "bracket creep". Hence, we would expect only small effects from the "bracket creep" on the individual's savings and labor supply. Díaz-Giménez et al. (1997) find a value of 0.51 for households aged 36-50. The Gini coefficient of the total net income is smaller and amounts to only 0.49 as income is taxed progressively and transfers are distributed lump-sum. Our empirical analysis suggests that there exists an inflation rate in the range above 10%
that minimizes the inequality in the income distribution. In addition, this magnitude of the inflation rate was observed over the last half of the 1970s. In order to consider the effects of a higher inflation rate, we recomputed the model for the money growth rate θ = π = 10%.
The results for the high-inflation economy are summarized in Table 5 .
Following an increase of inflation from 5% to 10%, agents reduce their stationary real money balances. The average real money balancesm t drops from 0.142 to 0.090. Furthermore, agents are subject to a more severe "bracket creep" and governmental tax receipts increase by a higher percentage between period 0, 1, and 2. Again, our finding for an inflation rate π = 5% is confirmed that aggregate savings and average labor supply increase during the course of "bracket creep". In addition, higher inflation reduces both the average labor supply and the inequality of the after-tax income distribution in the presence of "bracket creep". However, quantitative effects are very small in the case of the income distribution and both the Gini coefficient of the pre-tax wage distribution and the total net income distribution are only affected to a negligible extent. In particular, the Gini coefficient of total net income two periods after the most recent tax schedule adjustment only drops from 0.492 to 0.489.
As has been documented in section 2, the U.S. government used to adjust its income tax schedule less frequently in the years prior to 1985 than in recent years. In order to analyze the effects of a less frequent income tax schedule adjustment and, hence, a longer duration of the "bracket creep", we extend the duration of the "bracket creep" to T B = 4 years (keeping the inflation rate at π = 5%). As can be seen by inspection of Table 6 , agents 6 Conclusion "Bracket creep" has often been cited in the literature as one of the main reasons for an income-inequality reducing effect of (moderate) inflation. Both our empirical and our theoretical analysis support this hypothesis. The quantitative effects of higher inflation on (income) inequality, however, are rather small and merely of economic significance, in particular, in our DSGE model. They crucially depend on the indexation system that is in place. We therefore, carefully conclude that income redistribution due to "bracket creep"
should not have been a major policy concern during the total U.S. postwar period. One important reason, of course, is that the U.S. income tax schedule has also been characterized by a lower progression than tax income schedules of other countries, e.g. many continental European countries such as, Germany, among others. For this reason, an interesting extension of our analysis would be the study of these countries.
In addition, we find that, in our theoretical model, the duration of the "bracket creep", i.e. the time period between two successive income tax schedule adjustments, is more important for equilibrium values of aggregate savings and average labor supply than the annual change in the tax rates due to "bracket creep". A shorter duration of "bracket creep" results in higher equilibrium labor supply and output. Our results give support to possible benefits from the change in the U.S. tax policy in 1985 as, by the mid 1980s, the U.S. tax system became effectively inflation-indexed. The post-war changes of the U.S. income tax schedule are summarized in Table 7 below.
The main source of the entries in this table is the IRS (2003) For more detail on the major legislative changes enacted and realized during the period of observation the reader is referred to the brief outline in the text or to Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) . The changes of tax brackets reported in the following (ii) mean frequency (yrs) 2.11 3.00 1.63
In general, there are four different (historical) sets of rates and brackets depending on the respective tax paying person(s): First, "income splitters", i.e. married taxpayers who "use the joint return filling status" and split their income for tax purposes in an effort to effectively double the width of their taxable (or net income) size brackets. Figures underlying the chronological categorization of Table 7 above are based on this set. Second, starting with 1952, a set of rates was introduced for "heads of households", i.e., for unmarried individuals who paid over half of the cost of maintaining a home for a qualifying person (e.g., a child or parent), or for certain married individuals who had lived apart from their spouses for the last six months of the tax year. This filling status was liberalized in 1970 and provides approximately half the advantages of the income-splitting. Third, the so-called "surviving spouse"-set of rates and brackets for which both, rates and taxable income brackets, are designed analogously to the ones of income-splitters. Finally, the remaining taxpayer-set is given for single persons. Since the late 1960s there has been an effort of convergence of this set with the one of married couples filling jointly.
It is noteworthy that the 1986 Reform Act implemented during the Reagan-era hallmarks the start of a new period of lower rates and a reduced number of tax brackets. The latter along with the fact that by 1985 the U.S. income tax system became effectively inflationindexed, led us to discriminate, in our empirical analysis, between the full sample period (1948-2004) and the 1948-84 and 1985-2004 subsamples.
Computation
The model of section 3 cannot be solved analytically, but only numerically. The solution algorithm is described by the following steps:
1. Parameterize the model. Let T B denote the number of years between two adjustments of the nominal income tax schedule. We discretize the state space (k, m, z) using an equispaced grid over the capital stock k, the money balances m, and the individual productivity z. The upper grid points k max = 20.0 and m max = 0.4 are found to be non-binding. For the productivity z, the (five-point) grid ranges from −2σ y 1 to 2σ y 1 . The probability of having productivity shock z 1 in the first period of life is computed by integrating the area under the normal distribution.
The transition probabilities are computed using the method of Tauchen (1986) . As a consequence, the efficiency index e(z, j) follows a finite Markov chain.
In step 4, a finite-time dynamic programming problem is to be solved. We use piecewise linear functions in order to approximate the policy functions c t (k, m, z, j) , k t (k, m, z, j), m t (k, m, z, j) , and l t (k, m, z, j) between grid points. In particular, we solve the Euler functions (12)- (15) for given sequence of the aggregate capital stock K t , aggregate effective employment N t , and transfers tr t . The methods for the computation of the policy functions and the aggregate variables are described in detail in Heer and Maußner (2005) .
As the household is born without any assets, his first-period wealth and his real money balances are zero. As a consequence, the value function would take the value −∞ as m 1t = 0. For computational purposes, therefore, we slightly change the utility function and introduce a small constant ψ into (8),ũ = u(c, m + ψ, 1 − l).
